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NOTES
case the contractual undertaking of the seller was to deliver the
specific paint in question. The paint was declared to be mold and
mildew resistant. As it was proved not to be mold and mildew
resistant, the declaration of quality was false. Since a false
declaration of quality gives rise to the redhibitory action, the
court's application of the one-year prescription rule seems
correct.
Charles M. Lanier
SECURITY DEVICES-SURETYSHIP-DEFIcIENcY JUDGMENT ACT
The defendant Scheen purchased an automobile from a
corporation whose president and principal stockholder was the
defendant Mingledorff. Scheen borrowed the purchase price
from the plaintiff bank. As security for this loan Scheen exe-
cuted a note to the plaintiff. The note was endorsed by Mingle-
dorff and secured by a chattel mortgage on the automobile.
When Scheen defaulted, Mingledorff persuaded him to sign an
instrument requesting the plaintiff to repossess the automobile
and sell it at private sale in order to avoid the cost and expense
of a public sale. By the terms of this instrument, prepared by
Mingledorff, Scheen as its signer agreed to waive appraisement
and pay the plaintiff bank any deficiency after the sale. After
the private auction sale, plaintiff sued for a deficiency judgment
in solido against Scheen, the maker of the note, and Mingledorff,
its endorser. The trial court held that Scheen was discharged
from liability by the terms of the Deficiency Judgment Act,'
and that Mingledorff was discharged from liability by the terms
of Civil Code article 3061,2 because, as surety, he was prevented
of Goods, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 71 (1901). Similar English cases are found in
BENJAMIN, SALE 616 et seq. (8th ed. 1950). See illustrations in 1 WILLISTON,
SALES 180 and discussion at § 225 et seq. (rev. ed. 1948).
1. LA. R.S. 13:4106 (1950): "In any case where any mortgagee or other
creditor takes advantage of the waiver of appraisement of the debtor and
provokes a judicial sale, without the benefit of appraisement, of the encum-
bered property, whether real or personal, or of both characters, and the
proceeds of such sale are insufficient to satisfy the debt for which the
property is sold, the debt nevertheless shall stand fully satisfied and dis-
charged, . . . and such mortgagee or other creditor shall not thereafter
have the right to proceed against the debtor or any other of his property
for such deficiency, in any manner whatsoever."
LA. R.S. 13:4107 (1950): "R.S. 13:4106 declares a public policy and the
provisions thereof can not, and shall not be waived by a debtor ....
2. The article provides: "The surety is discharged when by the act of
the creditor, the subrogation to his rights, mortgages and privileges can
no longer be operated in favor of the surety."
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by the creditor's act from being subrogated to the creditor's
rights against the debtor. On appeal, held, affirmed as to Scheen
but reversed as to Mingledorff. The Deficiency Judgment Act
was enacted for the protection of the mortgage debtor only and
not those secondarily liable, such as endorsers. Moreover, be-
cause Mingledorff "promoted and negotiated ' 3 the private sale,
he was precluded by his own actions from availing himself of
the provisions of Civil Code article 3061. The Farmerville Bank
v. Scheen, 76 So.2d 581 (La. App. 1954).
The fundamental characteristic of the surety's contract
in civil law jurisdictions is that it is accessory 4 and presupposes
the existence of a principal debt.5 His obligation being acces-
sory, the surety may use against the creditor all the exceptions
belonging to the principal debtor which are inherent in the
principal debt." This accessory feature distinguishes the surety-
ship contract from other contracts binding a person for the
debt of another, such as an absolute promise to pay the debt
of another.7 When the surety binds himself in solido with the
debtor, his obligation to the creditor is governed by the section
of the Code on solidary obligations.8 Although the surety bound
in solido may not avail himself of the pleas of discussion or
division,9 the full effects of suretyship obtain between himself
3. The Farmerville Bank v. Scheen, 76 So.2d 581, 586 (La. App. 1954).
4. Art. 3035, LA, CIVIL CODE of 1870, provides: "Suretyship is an accessory
promise by which a person binds himself for another already bound, and
agrees with the creditor to satisfy the obligation, if the debtor does not."
Gay & Co. v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 497 (1880); Andrus v. Chretien, 3 La.
48 (1831). FRENCH CODE CIVIL art. 2012 provides: "Le cautionnement ne peut
exister que sur une obligation valable .... "
5. See Hubert, The Nature and Essentials of Conventional Suretyship,
13 TUL. L. REV. 519, 529 (1939).
6. Art. 3060, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, provides: "The surety may oppose to
the creditor all the exceptions belonging to the principal debtor, and which
are inherent to the debt; but he can not oppose exceptions which are per-
sonal to the debtor." Simmons v. Clark, 64 So.2d 520 (La. App. 1953).
7. Watson Bros. v. Jones, 125 La. 249, 51 So. 187 (1910); Williams v.
Breazeale-Hyams Motors, Inc., 16 La. App. 291, 134 So. 330 (1931); Lawrason
v. Banister, 13 La. App. 610, 128 So. 318 (1930).
8. Art. 3045, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, provides: "The obligation of the surety
towards the creditor is to pay him in case the debtor should not himself
satisfy the debt; and the property of such debtor is to be previously dis-
cussed or seized, unless the security should have renounced the plea of dis-
cussion, or should be bound in solido jointly with the debtor, in which case
the effects of his engagements are to be regulated by the same principles
which have been established for debtors in solido." Smith v. Scott, 3 Rob.
258 (La. 1842); Morgan v. Young, 5 Mart.(o.s.) 364 (1818); Ashton v. Morgan,
2 Mart.(o.s.) 336, 5 Am. Dec. 733 (1812). See Comment, Solidary Obligations,
25 TUL. L. REV. 217 (1951).
9. Brock v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 187 La. 766, 175 So. 569 (1937);
Edward Bruce Co. v. Lambour, 123 La. 969, 49 So. 659 (1909); Bond v. Bishop,
18 La. Ann. 549 (1866); State v. Winfree's Securities, 12 La. Ann. 643 (1857);
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and the debtor.10 Whether the surety is bound in solido or not,
he is released if his right of subrogation to the creditor's rights
against the debtor is impaired by the act of the creditor."
Co-debtors in solido may plead all exceptions resulting from
the nature of the obligation and those which are common to all
the debtors, but may not plead exceptions which are merely
personal to another co-debtor. 12 An obligation in solido is not
presumed but must be expressly created or clearly implied.13
The Deficiency Judgment Act provides that a mortgage
creditor must forego his claim for any deficiency if he takes
advantage of a waiver of appraisement by the debtor and pro-
vokes a judicial sale without appraisement.' 4 The act declares
this provision a matter of public policy which cannot be waived
by the debtor.15 Though specifically applicable only to judicial
sales without appraisement, it has been extended by analogy
to include private sales without appraisement. 16 The act does
not prevent the creditor from taking advantage of the waiver
by provoking a sale without appraisement; if he does, the statute
destroys his right to recover for any deficiency.' 7 The courts
have held that it applies with equal force to sales made pur-
suant to collateral waivers made after the original contract,',
as well as to waivers in the mortgage instrument itself.1 9 South-
land Investment Co. v. Motor Sales Co.20 is the only case in
New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Escoffie, 2 La. Ann. 830 (1847); cf.
Arts. 2094 (division) and 3045, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; Comment, Solidary
Obligations, 25 TUL. L. REV. 217 (1951).
10. Art. 2106, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, provides: "If the affair for which
the debt has been contracted in solido, concern only one of the coobligors
in solido, that one is liable for the whole debt towards the other codebtors,
who, with regard to him, are considered only as his securities." Marfese v.
Nelson, 10 Orl. App. 288 (La. App. 1913).
11. Cf. Arts. 2106, 3061, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; Brewer v. Foshee, 189 La.
220, 179 So. 87 (1938).
12. Cf. Art. 2098, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
13. Art. 2093, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; George Moroy Cigar & Tobacco Co.
v. Henriques, 184 So. 403 (La. App. 1938); Industrial Loan Co. v. Noe, 183
So. 175 (La. App. 1938); Dodd v. Lakeview Motors, 149 So. 278 (La. App.
1933).
14. LA. R.S. 13:4106 (1950).
15. LA. R.S. 13:4107 (1950).
16. Farmer v. Smith, 57 So.2d 778 (La. App. 1952); Futch v. Gregory,
40 So.2d 830 (La. App. 1949); Southland Investment Co. v. Lofton, 194 So.
125 (La. App. 1940); Home Finance Service v. Walmsley, 176 So. 415 (La.
App. 1937).
17. Simmons v. Clark, 64 So.2d 520 (La. App. 1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 285 (1953).
18. Southland Investment Co. v. Lofton, 194 So. 125 (La. App. 1940);
Home Finance Service v. Walmsley, 176 So. 415 (La. App. 1937).
19. Simmons v. Clark, 64 So.2d 520 (La. App. 1953).
20. 198 La. 1028, 5 So.2d 324 (1941).
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which the Supreme Court has had occasion to apply the act. In
that case the plaintiff sued the endorser of promissory notes for
the deficiency remaining after private sales of certain mort-
gaged automobiles without appraisement. Although the endorse-
ments were unconditional, it had been agreed that the defen-
dant would become liable as endorser only if the plaintiff re-
possessed the automobiles and turned them over to the defen-
dant. The plaintiff repossessed a number of automobiles and,
"with the consent and acquiescence of the defendants, '21 sold
them at private sale. The defendant contended that by the terms
of the Deficiency Judgment Act, the obligation had been satis-
fied by the sales made without appraisement. The court, ob-
serving that the Deficiency Judgment Act was designed to pro-
tect the mortgagor only, held the defendant liable. In answer
to the defendant's argument that, by the terms of section 120
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a person secondarily liable
on an instrument is discharged . . .by an act which discharges
the instrument,' '2 2 the court emphasized that the cars had been
sold with the defendant's "consent and acquiescence" and found
"under these circumstances . .. the defendant is liable." By the
terms of the contract involved in the Motor Sales case, a con-
dition precedent to the endorser's liability was the turning over
of the repossessed cars to him. This condition having been pre-
vented from occurring by the plaintiff's sale of the cars, it seems
that the only possible basis for holding the defendant endorser
liable would be a finding of an express agreement made subse-
quent to the original contract. This conclusion seems particu-
larly unavoidable in view of the fact that suretyship contracts
are strictly construed and not extended by implication.2 3 Unfor-
tunately, the opinion in the Motor Sales case is not clear as
to whether the court found such a subsequent agreement in
the endorser's "consent and acquiescence''24 to the sale. In
Simmons v. Clark,21 decided after the Motor Sales case, the
defendant sureties were sued for a deficiency remaining after
mortgaged property had been judicially sold without appraise-
ment. In sustaining the exceptions of no cause or right of action
the court looked to Civil Code articles 3060 providing that the
21. 198 La. 1028, 1034, 5 So.2d 324, 326 (1941).
22. LA. R.S. 7:120 (1950).
23. Art. 3039, LA. CIVIL CODr of 1870, provides: "Suretyship can not be
presumed; it ought to be expressed, and is to be restrained within the limits
intended by the contract." Wells v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 146 La. 169, 83
So. 448 (1919); Shreveport Laundries v. Sherman, 7 So.2d 433 (La. App. 1942).
24. 198 La. 1028, 1034, 5 So.2d 324, 326 (1941).
25. 64 So.2d 520 (La. App. 1953).
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surety may assert any defense available to the debtor except
those which are purely personal, and 3061 providing that the
surety is discharged when the creditor's act prevents the surety
from being subrogated to the creditor's rights against the debtor.
The court held that either article was sufficient ground on which
to sustain the exception.
In the instant case the court had no difficulty in finding
that Scheen, the maker of the note, was discharged from lia-
bility. Any other view, said the court, would be "inimicable to
the public policy of the state '26 declared in the Deficiency
Judgment Act. The endorser Mingledorff had convinced the
trial court that Civil Code article 3061 and the holding in Sim-
mons v. Clark justified releasing him from liability. The court
of appeal, although agreeing with the application of article
3061 to the facts of the Simmons case, stated that the instant
case Was readily distinguishable from that case, because the
defendant surety, Mingledorff, had actively promoted and nego-
tiated the private sale. After quoting at length from the Motor
Sales case, the court said that, "as was substantially held"2 7 in
that case, the defendant "is precluded . . .by his own actions"28
from availing himself of article 3061.
The Deficiency Judgment Act serves a sound public policy
by affording protection to the mortgagor who otherwise could
be forced to waive by agreement the benefit of appraisement.
Consistent with this policy, the court in the instant case properly
held that the mortgagor was discharged from his indebtedness.
With regard to the endorser's liability, however, the decision
does not appear to be legally sound. Although the endorser,
acting in good faith, never agreed to relinquish his rights against
the debtor, the latter was absolved of all liability and the en-
dorser held responsible without recourse against him.29 This
absence of an agreement between the endorser and the plaintiff
would seem to make this case distinguishable from the Motor
Sales case because in that case, as previously stated, the endorser
26. Farmerville Bank v. Scheen, 76 So.2d 581, 584 (La. App. 1954).
27. Id. at 586.
28. Ibid.
29. See LA. R.S. 13:4106 (1950), which provides that where the mortgaged
property is sold at unappraised sale, "the debt shall . .. .stand fully satisfied
and discharged. . . . and such mortgagee or other creditor shall not there-
after have the right to proceed against the debtor . . . in any manner what-
soever." (Emphasis added.) See also Simmons v. Clark, 64 So.2d 520, 523
(La. App. 1953), where the court stated: "[T]he petitioner [creditor] has
no right or mortgage which might be subrogated in favor of defendants
[endorsers] should the demand of petitioner be allowed."
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could have been liable only by a subsequent agreement, since
his liability within the scope of his original suretyship contract
never arose. The Motor Sales case was also cited as authority
for the proposition that the Deficiency Judgment Act is not for
the protection of "parties secondarily or otherwise obligated for
the indebtedness. 3 Be this as it may the court seems to over-
look the fact that the surety in the instant case was being sued
as a primary debtor, liable in solido with the mortgage debtor.
Being directly responsible for the debt, the surety bound- in
solido has the same interest in having the mortgaged property
appraised as does the real debtor, and the Deficiency Judgment
Act ought to afford him protection. If on the other hand the
surety was by contract not bound in solido, then it would seem
that the very definition of suretyship as an accessory obligation
would have precluded his liability. It is inconceivable that there
can be an accessory obligation to secure the performance of an
.extinguished principal obligation.
J. Bennett Johnston, Jr.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PRESCRIPTION-
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
Plaintiff's employment in defendant's paper mill required
him to work "constantly in contact with chemicals and water."'
He contracted blastomycosis, a form of dermatosis, at some time
prior to March 7, 1952, at which time he filed a claim with def en-
dant's health insurer, stating that the cause of his disability
was blastomycosis. By April 1, 1952, ulcers and sores had begun
-to appear on plaintiff's body. When treatment by several doctors
failed to alleviate his condition, plaintiff, "due to the inroads of
the disease,"'2 was forced to stop working on August 15, 1952.
When his bones and lungs became affected, he reported to a
veterans hospital where he was hospitalized from January 12,
1953, to April 29, 1953. Plaintiff did not learn of any connection
between his disease and his employment, however, until July
13, 1953, when he consulted a doctor who expressed the opinion
that such a connection existed. On July 29, 1953, he instituted
this suit for workmen's compensation allegedly due by reason of
30. The Farmerville Bank v. Scheen, 76 So.2d 581, 586 (La. App. 1954).
1. 76 So.2d 621, 622 (La. App. 1954).
2. Ibid.
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